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Abstract
Non-technical skills in high-reliability industries include decision making, interpersonal communication and personal resil-
ience. It has been argued that these skills are key to effective performance, safety and welfare. However, there is no agreed 
upon set of such skills or formal means to identify and assess them for incident commanders in the UK fire and rescue service 
(FRS). The aim of this research was to identify the non-technical skills that underpin effective incident command in the UK 
FRS, and to develop a behavioural marker system that captures these skills. Our research assessed the current range of train-
ing offered in non-technical skills across the UK FRS, and identified the non-technical skills of incident command within the 
UK FRS through interviews with incident commanders, and workshops with subject-matter experts. The six non-technical 
skills were: assertive, effective and safe leadership; effective decision making and planning; interpersonal communication; 
personal resilience; situational awareness; and teamwork and interoperability. A bespoke behavioural marker system, called 
THINCS, was developed with exemplary behaviours for each skill.
Keywords Non-technical skills · Behavioural marker system · Incident command
1 Introduction
High-reliability industries distinguish between a person’s 
technical and non-technical skills: Technical skills include 
knowledge of procedures, hazards and apparatus, whereas 
non-technical skills include decision making, interpersonal 
communication and personal resilience. Historically, the UK 
fire and rescue service (FRS) has emphasised the importance 
of technical skills. However, incident commanders within 
the FRS have a multi-faceted role, which requires them 
to have both technical and non-technical skills (National 
Operational Guidance Programme 2015). The non-tech-
nical skills impact on their ability to work in challenging 
environments, which are often dangerous and dynamic as 
well as being emotionally charged and stressful (Health and 
Safety Executive 2010). The role combines decision making 
with a variety of other non-technical skills (Klein 2008). As 
in other high-reliability industries (e.g., aviation, marine, 
oil and gas exploration, and healthcare), investigations of 
high-profile incidents involving the deaths of members of 
the public and/or firefighters have implicated deficiencies in 
the non-technical skills of incident commanders in the UK 
FRS (see Torrie 2012; GMFRS 2016, pp. 4–5; Watterson 
2015). The National Fire Chiefs Council1 now emphasises 
the importance of training non-technical skills because ‘they 
enhance the ability of a Commander to effectively lead and 
control an incident.’ (CFOA 2015, p. 9); and the UK FRS 
National Operational Guidance Programme (2016) stressed 
how incident commanders should utilise non-technical skills 
to ‘…underpin their judgements, decisions and behaviours’ 
(p. 7). However, there has been no systematic assessment of 
the non-technical skills that underpin effective incident com-
mand, with the result that the UK FRS has had no consistent 
means to assess them.
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1.1  Non‑technical skills and accident causation
Human error is a major causal factor in accidents at work 
(see Flin et al. 2008; Health and Safety Executive 1999; 
Reason 1997; Shappell and Weigmann 1997). Reason 
(1990) defined human error as ‘…planned actions that fail 
to achieve their desired consequences without the inter-
vention of some chance or unforeseeable agency’ (p. 17). 
Human errors include slips (of attention) and lapses (of 
memory) that affect skilled performance, and mistakes that 
are associated with a lack of knowledge or applying the 
wrong rule to a situation (see Rasmussen 1982). One lead-
ing model of accident causation proposes that a series of 
defensive barriers (e.g., effective training) lie between a 
hazard and an accident, and that an accident occurs when 
there are defects (holes) in these barriers that align and 
allow the hazard to result in an accident (Reason 1997). 
Reason (2008) argued that non-technical skills are one 
defensive barrier. One source of evidence that is consist-
ent with the view that high levels of non-technical skills 
are related to low levels of error comes from a study that 
investigated indices of surgical excellence and behavioural 
markers of non-technical skills. The performance of 16 
surgeons was rated, and the 4 who made the least errors 
and exhibited high levels of safety awareness received high 
ratings for their non-technical skills (Carthey et al. 2003). 
While this evidence involves a relatively small sample, 
and the causal nature of the observed relationship cannot 
be determined, the results suggest that non-technical skills 
might reduce error and increase safety.
1.2  Non‑technical skills in high‑reliability industries
Identifying non-technical skills within high-reliability 
industries, and developing behavioural markers systems 
to rate them is recognised as an important component of 
safety management. As already noted, deficiencies in non-
technical skills have been implicated, by accident inves-
tigations and/or public inquiries, in accidents in many 
high-reliability industries (see Weick 1990; Air Accident 
Investigation Bureau 1990; Marine Casualties Investiga-
tive Body 2012; Crichton et al. 2005; Health Commis-
sion 2009). Retrospective analyses of aircraft accidents, in 
particular, have suggested that there was a need to provide 
training that would support the development of non-tech-
nical skills (e.g., Flin et al. 2008). This became known as 
crew resource management (CRM) training (Helmreich 
et al. 1999). The efficacy of this training can be assessed 
using a behavioural marker system that consists of a set 
of observable domain-specific behaviours that relate to 
the set of non-technical skills (Klampfer et  al. 2001) 
together with a rating system for those skills (Flin and 
Martin 2001). This approach has also been adopted for 
surgeons, anaesthetists, ships officers and nuclear power 
reactor engineers (see Devitt and Holford 2010; Fletcher 
et al. 2004; O’Connor et al. 2008; Yule et al. 2006). There 
is also some evidence that training in non-technical skills 
reduces error in a healthcare setting. Using a before and 
after design, in a single group of participants, non-techni-
cal skills training improved these skills and this improve-
ment was accompanied by a reduction in the number of 
errors (McCulloch et al. 2009; see, for a review; Kodate 
et al. 2012).
1.3  The UK FRS context
The performance of incident commanders in the UK FRS 
is influenced by many factors, which are summarized in 
Fig. 1. These factors include incident characteristics, indi-
vidual characteristics and the nature of the command team. 
The role of incident commander clearly involves a broad 
range of non-technical skills, which have been highlighted 
by national bodies. For example, The Department for Com-
munities and Local Government (2013, p. 32) published a 
health and safety framework specifically for the operational 
environment of the UK FRS which stated that: “Fire and 
Rescue Authorities should consider the impact of ‘human 
factors’ on the safe, effective and timely resolution of an 
incident. This includes…human and individual character-
istics that influence the behaviour of teams and individuals. 
Understanding these ‘human factors’ is critical to effective 
health, safety and welfare management.” Guidance pub-
lished by the National Operational Guidance Programme 
(2016) identifies non-technical (command) skills, which 
overlap with those from other safety–critical settings, and 
have been linked to the high-profile incidents involving the 
UK FRS noted above. However, there has been no system-
atic assessment of the non-technical skills that underpin 
effective incident command and, consequently, there is no 
behavioural marker system for incident command in the 
UK FRS. The development of such a system would enable 
the National Fire Chiefs Council (who are the professional 
voice of the fire and rescue service) to meet some of the 
challenges that are faced in relation to incident command, 
including improving the selection, assessment and develop-
ment of incident commanders. We first conducted a survey 
of the UK FRS that assessed the current range of training 
in non-technical skills. The results of this survey provided a 
context for the main aim of our research, which was to iden-
tify the non-technical skills of incident command within the 
UK FRS. This was achieved through interviews with inci-
dent commanders, and workshops involving subject-matter 
experts. A behavioural marker system was then developed 
to enable these skills to be evaluated. Finally, we conducted 
a preliminary evaluation of the system.
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2  Materials and methods
2.1  Study design
We conducted an online survey of UK FRS incident com-
mand training centre managers to get a snapshot of non-
technical skills training across the UK FRS. The survey used 
the generic descriptors for non-technical skills identified 
for other high-reliability industries (i.e., decision making, 
communication, leadership, situational awareness, stress and 
fatigue management, and teamwork; Flin et al. 2008). The 
results of the survey provide a clear impetus and context for 
the development of a bespoke behavioural marker system 
for the UK FRS, and identifies gaps and inconsistencies in 
training provision, which the new system has the potential 
to address.
The development of the behavioural marker system 
(THINCS: THe INcident Command Skills of the UK FRS) 
was based primarily on (1) semi-structured interviews with 
incident commanders, and (2) a series of subject-matter 
expert workshops. In particular, the transcribed content of 
the interviews was analysed using thematic analysis (Braun 
and Clarke 2006; see also; Roberts et al. 2015). This is a 
structured method for identifying, analysing and reporting 
themes; and the process followed a theory-driven approach 
to examine the presence and nature of the generic non-tech-
nical skills and sub skills identified by Flin et al. (2008). This 
approach identified a broad range of non-technical skills 
associated with incident command, while the workshops 
refined these skills and agreed a set of behavioural markers 
for them. This is an example of the use of the development 
rationale described by Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) 
in which the results gained through the use of one method 
(semi-structured interviews) provided the basis for and con-
tinuity with the next method (subject-matter expert work-
shops; see also, Bryman 2006). The use of subject-matter 
experts allowed us to draw on their domain knowledge, and 
to characterize patterns of behaviour that are indicative of 
each non-technical skill (for a review, see Klein 2008). More 
specifically, we recruited a subject-matter expert from each 
level of command to increase the applicability of the sys-
tem across different levels of command. Our design mirrors 
the approach used in the context of other high-reliability 
industries (see Crichton and Flin 2004; Fletcher et al. 2004; 
Mitchell et al. 2011; O’Connor and Long 2011; Roberts 
et al. 2015). We also conducted a preliminary evaluation of 
THINCS to assess its utility and to inform the development 
of an associated app.
Fig. 1  Factors that influence 
the performance of incident 
commanders (adapted from 
Youngson 2016)
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2.2  Participants
2.2.1  Online survey of non‑technical skills training
The survey was sent to 48 of the 53 local authority UK FRS 
incident command training centre managers; there were 
no contact details for the remaining 5 UK FRSs. Although 
no demographic data were sought about individual train-
ing centre managers, the typical role of an incident com-
mand training centre manager within the UK FRS is that 
of a middle manager (i.e., station-to-area manager). They 
are responsible for organising incident command training 
for continuous professional development as well as incident 
command assessment centres. 27 (56%) of the training cen-
tre managers responded in full to the survey. Every nation of 
the UK was represented (except Northern Ireland), as were 
all 11 National Fire Chief Council regions, including 6 of 
the 7 larger, metropolitan FRSs in England. The majority 
(74%) of the FRSs who responded were county-based. Of 
those who did not complete the survey in full, 10 (21%) did 
not respond, 7 (15%) partially completed it, 3 (6%) did not 
consent to participate, and 1 (2%) was unable to complete 
the survey due to IT difficulties.
2.2.2  Semi‑structured interviews with incident 
commanders
20 incident commanders (17 Level 1 and 3 Level 2 com-
manders) participated. Level 1 incident commanders are 
usually the first Fire and Rescue staff on scene at an incident, 
and Level 2 commanders take charge of medium and large 
incidents requiring greater command and control (National 
Operational Guidance Programme 2015). At the time of 
their interviews, all the participants were serving incident 
commanders, either as a Station, Watch or Crew Manager.
2.2.3  Subject‑matter expert workshops
The selection of the 5 subject-matter experts who contrib-
uted to 7 workshops was based on the following criteria: one 
representative from each level of command; all operation-
ally active incident commanders; and either a member of 
the National Operational Guidance Programme project to 
revise and develop UK FRS incident command policy, or, 
an incident command training manager, or, a member of 
the National Fire Chiefs Council’s National Command and 
Control Working Group. The subject-matter experts were: 
an Assistant Chief Fire Officer (Level 4 commander), a Dep-
uty Assistant Commissioner (Level 3 and 4 commander), a 
Group Manager (Level 2 commander), a Station Manager 
and a Watch Manager. Level 3 incident commanders take 
charge of very large and complex incidents and Level 4 inci-
dent commanders represent their organisations at Strategic 
Co-ordinating Groups or, if in Scotland, Regional Resilience 
Partnerships (National Operational Guidance Programme 
2015). One of these experts was unavailable to participate in 
the development of the behavioural marker system and was 
replaced with two further subject-matter experts (a Group 
Manager and Watch Manager) for the final 2 workshops. 
This research was approved by the School of Psychology 
Ethics Committee, and participants gave informed consent 
for their participation.
2.3  Procedure
2.3.1  Online survey of non‑technical skills training
The survey of command training centre managers used Qual-
trics software (Qualtrics 2016) and was designed to reveal 
the extent to which non-technical skills training was evi-
dent across the UK FRS. The survey requested information 
about generic non-technical skills training based on other 
high-reliability industries (i.e., decision making, communi-
cation, leadership, situational awareness, stress and fatigue 
management, and teamwork; Flin et al. 2008). They were 
asked to indicate whether they provided training for each of 
the non-technical skills, whether the training was theoretical 
and/or practical, and which level(s) of incident commanders 
received the training. The survey contained six sets of identi-
cal questions that focused on each non-technical skill (e.g., 
‘Do you deliver practical training for practicing…[non-tech-
nical skill]…?’). The participants were given 3 weeks to 
complete the survey, during which time they received regu-
lar reminders. The survey was designed to allow respondents 
to complete it over a number of sessions. However, if more 
than 1 week passed without the survey being accessed it was 
terminated and the partial response collected. The full list of 
questions is available from the authors on request.
2.3.2  Semi‑structured interviews with incident 
commanders
The interviews were conducted as part of an earlier study in 
collaboration with the National Operational Guidance Pro-
gramme that reviewed incident command. The study investi-
gated UK FRS incident commander decision making, which 
involved placing helmet cameras on incident commanders 
at incidents and interviewing them using their footage after-
wards (Cohen-Hatton et al. 2015). The incident commanders 
who volunteered to participate were also interviewed about 
non-technical skills. Each interview lasted approximately 
1.5 h and was conducted in a private office at the fire station 
of the serving officer. Participants were asked open-ended 
questions about organisational culture and the basic set of 
non-technical skills that were identified in the summary pro-
vided by Flin et al. (2008) as being shared across a range 
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of high-reliability industries. Probe questions were used to 
explore the personal, social and cognitive skills referenced 
by the incident commanders to gain an insight into their 
significance and influence upon incident command (e.g., 
‘What makes a good team player?’). The probing question 
technique was adopted from the Critical Decision Method 
(Klein et al. 1989). The full list of probe questions is pre-
sented in the “Appendix”. The interview transcripts were 
uploaded onto NVivo 10 software (QSR International 2014), 
which was used to analyse them line by line to identify refer-
ences to non-technical skills and collate related references 
into themes.
2.3.3  Subject‑matter expert workshops
The themes drawn from the semi-structured interviews were 
used to inform the activities undertaken in a series of sub-
ject-matter expert workshops. The results of the online sur-
vey were also available to the experts. The seven workshops 
took place in classrooms or conference rooms at FRS fire 
stations/training venues. To identify a set of non-technical 
skills, the subject-matter experts were presented with the 
findings from the literature review, online survey, and the 
non-technical skills themes derived from the semi-structured 
interview transcripts. The research findings remained avail-
able for review throughout the workshops as points of refer-
ence if required. To effectively and efficiently review and 
refine these types of data, grid and sorting exercises were 
used. The subject-matter experts were tasked with categoris-
ing the non-technical themes into either personal, cognitive 
or social skills by placing them onto a grid subdivided into 
those areas. For example, pattern matching and decision 
making were categorised as cognitive skills; caring and lead-
ership as personal skills; and negotiation and trust as social 
skills. A sorting task was used to refine the themes based on 
relationships between them (cf. Fletcher et al. 2004; see also; 
Rugg and McGeorge 1997).
The subject-matter experts also reviewed the six emergent 
non-technical skills and their main and component themes, 
and refined them based on design criteria adapted from those 
used to develop non-technical skills for pilots (Flin et al. 
2003). These criteria were that the skills must be: observ-
able, discrete, and hierarchical; defined using industry ter-
minology; and follow the principle of parsimony to retain 
the minimum number of non-technical skills necessary. This 
process involved three stages. First, the experts discussed all 
of the themes grouped around an emergent non-technical 
skill and considered if they were observable and how fre-
quently they would be demonstrated by an incident com-
mander. This discussion isolated or reconfigured some of 
the main and component themes. Second, they defined the 
component themes in terms of a skill and subsumed them 
into the definitions of the main themes. Finally, the emergent 
non-technical skill was defined and labelled a ‘command 
skill’ with its main themes labelled ‘sub skills’ in accord-
ance with commonly understood UK FRS terminology. This 
process was repeated for each of the emergent non-technical 
skills and resulted in a prototype set of UK FRS command 
skills.
There were four further subject-matter expert workshops 
with four experts from the first workshops and two additional 
experts, which ensured all levels of command were repre-
sented. The first of these workshops involved the subject-
matter experts discussing and identifying specific, observ-
able behaviours indicative of good and poor performance 
for the sub skills of each command skill. The identified 
behaviours were reviewed and refined through further dis-
cussion into a set of exemplary behaviours for each sub skill. 
These behaviours were described as action statements that 
either directly or indirectly denoted the presence of a skill 
(e.g., an order indicating a type of decision making; Cohen-
Hatton et al. 2015; Cohen-Hatton and Honey 2015; Fletcher 
et al. 2004). The resulting behavioural maker system was 
further refined by cross-checking its content with UK FRS 
national occupational standards (Skills for Justice 2013a, 
b, 2014) and guidance for incident command to ensure that 
it was comprehensive. The workshops also developed a 
rating scale. A five point, quality-based Likert scale was 
selected, where a score of 4 (good) represented consistently 
high performance of the skill and 0 (unobserved) indicated 
that a skill should have been demonstrated but was omitted 
and so represented a significant risk to others. An additional 
rating of ‘not observed’ was incorporated to record when 
a skill was not relevant to the situation under observation. 
The subject-matter experts agreed that an individual’s com-
mand skill rating would be the mean of its sub skill ratings 
(excluding ‘not observed’ ratings).
3  Results
3.1  Online survey of non‑technical skills training
The online survey provided a snapshot of the nature and 
distribution of training in generic non-technical skills: deci-
sion making, situational awareness, leadership, teamwork, 
communication, and personal resilience (cf. Flin et al. 2008). 
Figure 2 depicts the number of UK fire and rescue services 
from the online survey that provided training in these non-
technical skills. Inspection of the figure shows that some 
form of decision making training (theoretical or practical) 
was provided by all of the 27 UK FRSs. However, there was 
less consistency in the provision of training in the remaining 
non-technical skills: with 25 providing training in situational 
awareness, 19 in leadership, 19 in communication, 20 in 
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teamwork, 14 in personal resilience (i.e., stress and fatigue 
management; and only 9 providing practical training).
The survey provided further details about the delivery of 
theoretical and practical training in non-technical skills. For 
example, 26 of the 27 UK FRSs (i.e., 96%) who provided 
theoretical training in decision making used the ‘Founda-
tion for Incident Command’ (National Operational Guidance 
Programme 2015). This document also formed the basis of 
theoretical training for each of the remaining skills: 20 of 
the 22 UK FRSs (91%) who provided theoretical training 
for situational awareness; 15 of the 17 for leadership (88%); 
15 of the 16 for teamwork (94%); 16 of the 18 for com-
munication (89%); and 14 of the 14 for resilience (100%). 
In terms of practical training, live exercises were the most 
frequently endorsed: 25 of 25 for decision making (100%); 
20 of 22 for situational awareness (91%); 14 of 14 for lead-
ership (100%); 17 of 18 for teamwork (94%); 14 of 15 for 
communication (93%); and 8 of 9 for resilience (89%). An 
additional noteworthy finding from the survey was that while 
a large number of those surveyed reported providing train-
ing in non-technical skills for Level 1 Incident Command-
ers this was not the case for Level 4 Incident Commanders. 
For example, 25 of the 27 UK FRSs (i.e., 93%) provided 
theoretical training in decision making for Level 1 Incident 
Commanders based on the ‘Foundation for Incident Com-
mand’ (National Operational Guidance Programme 2015), 
only 7 of the 27 (26%) provided this training for Level 4 
Incident Commanders. Similarly, while all 25 UK FRSs (i.e., 
100%) who provided practical training for decision making 
using live exercises did so for Level 1 Incident Commanders, 
only 6 (24%) did so for Level 4 Incident Commanders. This 
difference between Level 1 and Level 4 commanders was 
equally marked across (1) all of the non-technical skills that 
were surveyed, (2) theoretical and practical training, and (3) 
all sources of potential training. The amount of training pro-
vided to Level 2 and Level 3 commanders fell between that 
given to Level 1 and Level 4 commanders (further details 
available on request).
3.2  Semi‑structured interviews with incident 
commanders
The transcribed content of the interviews was analysed using 
thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2006; see also; Roberts 
et al. 2015), which is a structured method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting themes. A theory-driven approach 
was employed to examine the presence and nature of the 
non-technical skills and sub skills (cf. Flin et al. 2008). 
Thematic coding produced 59 different non-technical skills-
related themes from ‘adaptable’ to ‘working relationships’ 
(see Table 1). The themes consisted of a set of references to 
cognitive skills, attributes, and knowledge. The five themes 
that were referenced most often by incident commanders 
across all of the interview transcripts were: leadership (211), 
pressure (95), stress management (89), organisational culture 
(87) and decision making (69).
3.3  Subject‑matter expert workshops
The panel of experts were free to accept or reject the 59 
themes identified from the analysis of the interviews. This 
resulted in the rejection of one theme ‘red tape’ as they 
did not regard dealing with it as a non-technical skill. They 
refined the remaining 58 themes based on relationships 
between them into 20 main themes such as ‘planning’, 
which included a number of component themes such as 
risk management, priorities and resource control. The sub-
ject-matter experts could add a non-technical related item 
Fig. 2  The number of UK 
FRSs that provided training for 
each non-technical skill, and of 
those, the numbers who used 
theoretical and/or practical 
training methods
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they considered necessary based on their knowledge and 
experience. This added 12 items to seven of the 20 main 
themes: decision making method and decision evaluation 
were added to the ‘decision making’ theme; communica-
tion style and method were added to the ‘communication’ 
theme; setting standards and expectations were included 
in the ‘consistency’ theme; staff development was added to 
the ‘motivation’ theme; anticipation and expectation were 
included in the situational awareness theme; confidence 
and self-awareness were added to the ‘resilience’ theme; 
and skills matching to the ‘teamwork’ theme. The subject-
matter experts grouped the 20 main themes around six 
emergent non-technical skills: communication, decision 
making, leadership, personal resilience, situational aware-
ness and teamwork. The emergent ‘leadership’ non-techni-
cal skill comprised the main themes of consistency, lead-
ership, motivation, safety and values; ‘decision making’ 
comprised the main themes of adaptable, decision making 
and planning; and ‘communication’ comprised communi-
cation, briefing and interpersonal skills; ‘personal resil-
ience’ comprised the main themes fatigue, pressure and 
stress; ‘situational awareness’ comprised attention, experi-
ence, information gathering and situational awareness; and 
‘teamwork’ comprised team dynamics and teamwork. Fur-
ther refinement by the subject-matter experts determined 
a set of command skills and their associated sub skills 
(Table 2), and identified the exemplary behaviours for 
each one, which formed the THINCS system. For exam-
ple, Table 3 shows the good and poor practice behavioural 
markers for the sub skill ‘thinking time’ of the ‘personal 
resilience’ command skill.
4  Preliminary evaluation
To provide a preliminary assessment of the useability and 
the capacity of THINCS to discriminate between incident 
commanders, four raters independently scored the non-
technical command skills in six incident commanders. The 
recordings used were of incident commanders responding 
to real incidents (IC 1, IC 2 and IC 6), live exercises (IC 
3 and IC 4), and a computer-simulated exercise (IC 5). 
Two of the raters had been involved in the development 
of the system and 2 were naïve to the system. Each rater 
completed a questionnaire at the conclusion of the evalu-
ation. The questionnaire focused on how comprehensive 
the command skills and sub skills were, the behavioural 
markers, and the overall utility of the system. The raters 
were required to either rate an experience on a scale of 1–5 
(1 = very difficult to 5 = very easy), or respond to series 
of questions with yes/no answers to represent their views.
Figure 3 shows the mean ratings for each command 
skill for the six incident commanders; with each of score 
for a command skill being based on a mean of scores for 
between three and five sub skills. Inspection of the fig-
ure indicates that the use of THINCS by the four raters 
identified consistent performance differences between 
the 6 commanders. Notably, one incident commander (IC 
2) consistently received higher ratings across the com-
mand skills than the remaining incident commanders; 
and two incident commanders (IC 1 and IC 3) received 
consistently lower ratings than the remaining incident 
commanders. ANOVA conducted on the scores from the 
four raters, with the within-subjects variables of incident 
commander (IC 1–IC 6) and command skill as factors, 
revealed an effect of incident commander (F(5, 15) = 6.78, 
p < 0.005, np2 = 0.69), no effect of command skill (F < 1), 
Table 1  Themes derived from 
the interview transcripts Adaptable Dissonance Listening Red tape
Analytical Empathy Memory Resource control
Assertive Empowering Mental check list Respect
Attention Experience Motivation Responsibility
Briefing Fairness Negotiation Risk management
Caring Fatigue Organisational culture Safety
Communication Fatigue management Pattern matching Situational awareness
Competent Identify People-oriented Stress management
Confidence Information Perception Teamwork
Consistency Inspire Planning Technical support
Consultation Interpersonal skills Presence Thinking time
Cooperation Judgement Pressure Trust
Debrief Knowledge Priorities Understanding
Decision making Leadership Problem solving Working relationships
Delegation Learning Questioning
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Table 2  Prototype UK FRS 
command skills Command skill Sub skills
Assertive, effective and safe leadership Setting and maintaining standards 
of performance
Values and supports others
Leadership style
Competence
Safety leadership
Effective decision making and planning Intuitive decision making
Analytical decision making
Planning
Interpersonal communication Listening
Communication style
Briefing
Personal resilience Thinking time
Stress and fatigue management
Confidence
Situational awareness Information gathering
Understanding information
Anticipating incident developments
Teamwork and interoperability Cooperation
Team formation
People-oriented
Table 3  Exemplary behavioural markers for the sub skill ‘thinking time’ from the ‘personal resilience’ command skill of the THINCS system
Behavioural markers
Good practice Poor practice
Requests ‘quiet’ at the command location Fails to control the distractions at the command location
Creates a barrier, when necessary, to distractions, or physically removes 
self away from them
Fails to control others wishing to communicate, jeopardising the suc-
cessful transfer of critical information
Allocates appropriate command tasks to others to create time to think Becomes overloaded as fails to delegate roles and work appropriately
Maintains appropriate spans of control to effectively manage workload Becomes distracted and fails to respond to critical information and act 
in a timely manner
Fig. 3  Mean ratings (+ SEM) 
for each non-technical com-
mand skill for six incident com-
manders (IC 1–IC 6)
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and no interaction between these factors (F(25, 75) = 1.12, 
p = 0.34, np2 = 0.27); and post hoc tests with a Bonfer-
roni correction revealed a significant difference between 
IC 1 and IC 2 (p < 0.05). The fact that IC 1 and IC 2 dif-
fered significantly represents evidence that the raters were 
scoring them as consistently different from one another. 
We also conducted an analysis of inter-rater reliability on 
the mean scores pooled across all command skills, which 
were rounded to the closest whole numbers. This analysis 
revealed a Cronbach’s α = 0.87.
The questionnaire given to the raters confirmed that they 
thought that the system was comprehensive. On a scale of 
1–5 (1 = very difficult and 5 = very easy), the raters reported 
that it was straightforward to link the skills to observed 
behaviours (their ratings were: 4, 4, 4 and 3); and they indi-
cated that the documentation used to capture observations 
of, and feedback to, incident commanders was useful (their 
ratings were: 4, 3, 3 and 3).
5  Discussion
Deficiencies in non-technical skills have been linked to acci-
dents in several high-reliability industries (e.g., Crichton 
et al. 2005; Flin et al. 2008; Helmreich et al. 1999; Weick 
1990). The UK FRS has acknowledged the importance of 
incident commanders possessing an appropriate set of non-
technical skills. However, there is no agreed upon set of 
non-technical skills for the UK FRS, and there is no behav-
ioural marker system to assess them. A national survey of 
all UK FRSs established that the provision of training in 
(generic) non-technical skills is inconsistent: For example, 
while 25/27 of the respondents from the UK FRSs provided 
theoretical training in decision making for Level 1 Incident 
Commanders using the Foundation for Incident Command 
(National Operational Guidance Programme 2015), only 
14/27 provided training in personal resilience. There was 
clearly an unmet need to establish an agreed upon set of 
context-appropriate non-technical skills for incident com-
mand. Thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews 
with incident commanders resulted in the identification of 
59 themes, and workshops involving subject-matter experts 
refined these into six non-technical command skills (with 
associated sub skills). The six non-technical skills were: 
assertive, effective and safe leadership; effective decision 
making and planning; interpersonal communication; per-
sonal resilience; situational awareness; and teamwork and 
interoperability. On the basis of these skills, a behavioural 
marker system, called THINCS, was developed with exem-
plary behaviours for each skill and sub skill.
We attempted to ensure that the system was credible by 
basing it on converging evidence from incident command 
training managers, interviews with incident commanders, 
and subject-matter experts (Bryman 2012). The use of 
subject-matter experts at different levels of command was 
especially important in identifying behavioural markers 
for good and poor practice associated with the command 
skills used by incident commanders. The system was also 
informed by current UK FRS incident command guidance 
and national occupational standards. This overarching 
approach helped to ensure that the research represented 
different perspectives from the stakeholders and enabled 
the research to act as a potential catalyst for change (Guba 
and Lincoln 1994). In fact, the observation that training 
provision in generic non-technical skills was very uneven 
across different fire and rescue services (see Fig. 2) and 
levels of incident command, already provides one such 
catalyst.
A comparison of THINCS with other behavioural 
marker systems that have been developed for surgeons 
(NOTSS: non-technical skills for surgeons; Yule et al. 
2006) and European pilots (NOTECHS: non-technical 
skills for pilots; Flin et al. 2003) reveals that there are 
similarities and differences in the non-technical skills 
across these settings. The THINCS system consists of six 
non-technical skills and 20 sub skills, which is a higher 
number than other systems. For example, the NOTSS sys-
tem developed for surgeons and the NOTECHS system 
for European pilots both consist of four non-technical 
skills with 12 and 14 sub skills, respectively. THINCS 
shares non-technical skills with the other systems, such 
as leadership, decision making, situational awareness, and 
teamwork. For example, some of the sub skills involving 
situational awareness are similar across different domains 
(for a review, see Flin et al. 2008); acknowledging that 
there are differing views about the nature and utility of 
situational awareness as a theoretical construct (Carsten 
and Vanderhaegen 2015). Yet the working environment of 
incident commanders is very different from that of pilots 
and surgeons, and the sub skills that underpin the remain-
ing non-technical skills confirms the domain specificity of 
the three systems. Table 4 provides a direct comparison of 
the sub skills for the shared non-technical skills from the 
THINCS, NOTECHS and NOTSS systems. Inspection of 
Table 4 confirms that while there is overlap between the 
sub skills, there are significant differences in the terminol-
ogy used, emphasis and their nature.
The useability of a new system or tool plays an impor-
tant role in whether it is taken forward and used in practice 
(Fletcher et al. 2004). After feedback from the raters, the 
paper-based system was improved and a mobile tablet-
based app was developed, which affords greater ease of use 
in a range of operational, training and research settings. 
Prompted by feedback from the preliminary evaluation, 
the app integrates the observation and feedback systems. 
It also calculates the command skill rating and collates 
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time-stamped observations about each sub skill, which 
can be scored and used to provide immediate feedback 
to an incident commander. This feedback could be com-
municated alongside video footage of the commander’s 
performance.2
6  Conclusion
The THINCS system incorporates the generic non-tech-
nical skills described by Flin et al. (2008) and echoes the 
command skills within the UK FRS national guidance for 
incident command and its foundation document (National 
Operational Guidance Programme 2015, 2016). The system 
is domain specific: It was framed in UK FRS terminology, 
and developed with the assistance of subject-matter experts 
from within the service. The development of the THINCS 
system will assist the UK FRS to prepare its incident com-
manders more effectively, and to monitor and determine the 
influence that command skills have on incident outcomes. 
In so doing, human error might be reduced and the safety of 
UK FRS operations will be enhanced.
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Table 4  Comparison between the shared non-technical skills of the behavioural maker systems for FRS Incident Commanders (THINCS), Pilots 
(NOTECHS) and Surgeons (NOTSS)
THINCS NOTECHS NOTSS
Decision making Effective decision making and planning Decision making Decision making
Intuitive decision making Problem definition and diagnosis Considering options
Analytical decision making Option generation Selecting and communicating option
Planning Risk assessment and option selection Implementing and reviewing decisions
Outcome review
Leadership Assertive, effective and safe leadership Leadership Leadership
Setting and maintaining standards of 
performance
Use of authority and assertiveness Setting and maintaining standards
Values and supports others Providing and maintaining standards Supporting others
Leadership style Workload management Coping with pressure
Competence
Safety leadership
Situational awareness Situational awareness Situation awareness Situation awareness
Information gathering Awareness of aircraft systems Gathering information
Understanding information Awareness of external environment Understanding information
Anticipating incident developments Awareness of time Projecting and anticipating future state
Teamwork Teamwork and Interoperability Cooperation Communication and Teamwork
Cooperation Team-building and maintaining Exchanging information
Team formation Considering others Establishing a shared understanding
People oriented Supporting others
Conflict solving Coordinating team activities
2 The THINCS paper-based system, app, and guidance are avail-
able on request from the authors. It is freely available to the UK FRS 
under license from Cardiff University; and can be accessed by other 
organisations through independent licensing agreements with Cardiff 
University.
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Appendix
Non-Technical Skills Interview
Leadership and Command:
. What makes a good IC specifically?
o What is the skill set?. What makes a good leader?
o What is the skill set?. How does the culture/feel of the organisaon affect:
o How you command incidents?
o How you lead?
What is your leadership style?. Are there any other external influences upon your incident command?. What is expected of you as:
o A Commander by your staff/managers?
o A leader by your staff/managers?. Do you see incident command and leadership as the being the same?
o What are the differences?
o What are the similaries?
Decision Making:
. Can you describe how do you make decisions when incident commander?. Is there a difference between the ways you make a decision at the start of an incident 
compared to the end of an incident?
o What are the differences?
o Do you make assumpons?
Do you check them to be correct?. What influences your decision making?
o How?. What interferes with your decision making?
o How do you minimise these interferences?
Situaon awareness:
. Is there a point at which you fully understand what is happening at an incident, when you 
have got it?
o What does that feel like?. How do you get from knowing very li­le upon your arrival to fully understanding what is 
happening?
o What techniques do you use to achieve this as soon as possible?
o What resources do you use?. How do you maintain your situaon awareness?
o What techniques/resources do you use?. What is your role with regards to the management of informaon at an incident?
o How do you ensure it is communicated to others?
o How do you ensure required records are kept?
. Have you ever believed you fully understood what was going on only for something to 
happen that meant you did not?
o What did that feel like?
o How did you react and what do did you do to recover your lost situaon awareness?
Communicaon:
. How do you talk with people on the incident ground?
o Do you alter the way you talk to people?
What makes you alter the way you talk to them?. For effecve communicaon to take place between people what do you need?. What makes up a good briefing?
o What do you expect to receive from others?. Do you have a checklist that you check off as you brief/are being briefed?
o How do you fill any gaps?. How important is it to listen?. What skills do you need to be a good communicator?
Teamwork:
. What factors of teamwork impact upon your command at incidents?
o How do they affect decision making?
Does good team work impact upon decision making differently compared to 
bad teamwork?. How do you get the best out of your command team, i.e. the officers forming your command 
structure?. What makes a good team player?
Stress and Fague:
. What puts you under pressure at incidents?
o What techniques/resources do you use to cope with those pressures?. Do you know when you are under pressure?
o How does that manifest itself?. What makes you feel red at incidents?
o Do you know when you are red at incidents?
How does that manifest itself?
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